The Surety by Loyd, William H.
THE SURETY.
The surety is a favored debtor. It is said that no rule is
better settled.1 *"Where any act has -been done by the obligee
that may injure the surety the court is very glad to lay hold of
it in favor of the surety." 2 "There is no moral obligation on
the security beyond or superadded to his legal obligation.". 3
But upon what principles of justice is the rule founded? Is it
not the usual complex of tradition, psychology, and economics
that. makes most rules of law easier to state than to explain?
Active sympathy may be expected for one who has gratuitously
bound himself for the debt or default of another in disregard of
the scriptural warning.4 Antonio is not the only reckless hero
that has found a court predisposed to assist him. So also, it
may be politic to encourage co-operation in mercantile transac-
tions by reducing to a minimum .the risk of the accessory.5 The
doctrine, too, may have been inherited from an earlier state of
society where the very harshness of the law of suretyship called
for the strictest definition of its limits. All of these elements
may and usually do enter in varying proportions into the modern
attitude toward one of the oldest relations of the law.
Collateral security, that is a secondary obligation annexed
to a contract to guarantee its performance, or the pledging of
property to insure the performance of a principal engagement, or
to furnish means of indemnity in case of non-performance, is an
idea familiar to modern law and was fairly developed in the
legal systems of some of the civilized nations of antiquity. But,
speaking relatively, it is recent; that is, it is an idea that belongs
1 State v. Churchi 48 Ark. 426 (1886); In re Sherry, 25 Ch. D. 703
(1884); Brandt on Suretyship (3d Ed.), Sec. io6.
-2 Law v. East India Co., 4 Ves. 824 (x799).
'Winston v. lMves, 4 S. & P. (Ala.) 269 (1833) ; Ratcliffe v. Graves, i
Vern. 196 (1683); Simpson v. Field, 2 Chan. Ca. 22 (I679).
""He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it, and he that
hateth suretyship is sure." Proverbs xi, z5.
"Without these constant acts of mutual kindness and assistance, the
course of commerce .would be prodigiously impeded and disturbed." Per
Kent, C. J., in Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Caines Ca. I (x8o5), at page S&
(40)
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to the later growth of any system of law in which it appears.
For among primitive peoples there is no credit and each trans-
action must be final, in form at least. Difficulties would occur
chiefly in executing the judgments of the group assembled as a
court. The wrongdoer must pay, but present satisfaction is all
that the injured person is obliged to take. The delinquent may
then do one of three things. He may hand over property in
settlement of the liability, perhaps with the privilege of redemp-
tion, the forerunner of the modern pledge and mortgage. He
may surrender himself and work out the debt in quasi servitude.
Or, he may surrender to the creditor, a relative or friend, as a
provisional satisfaction while he proceeds to acquire the sum
directed to be paid, the predecessor of the modern surety or
guarantor." Indeed, the surety was in the beginning no more
than an animated gage or hostage, as that term is still under-
stood in international law,7 delivered over-to imprisonment, per-
haps servitude, but subject to redemption. He frees the debtor,
taking his place just as a res would." Brissaud, writing of the
early middle ages, a time of archaic survivals, describes the
position of the surety as follows:
"The creditor kept him near himself, sometimes sequestrated,
or even in irons; he was authorized to take vengeance upon him if
the debtor did not pay his debt at maturity, just as he would have
taken vengeance upon the person of the debtor (it was death, mutila-
tion, slavery for debts). Such a prospect as this must have led the
hostage to neglect no means of getting the debtor to free himself
of the obligation. Also, thenceforth one can account for two of
the most remarkable characteristics of the primitive suretyship: Ist,
in giving surety, the debtor frees himself; 2d, the death of the
surety destroys the right of the creditor; the fact of being in his
hands like a pledge could not be transmitted to the heirs of the
hostage. Of course, moreover, the creditor had to feed his hostage,
which gave rise to the gibe, 'The banquet of a hostage is a costly
banquet.' In order to avoid these expenses, the creditor gave up
the person of his hostage, or, rather, did not demand that the
'The Pledge-Idea by J. H. Wigmore, IO Harv. L Rev. 43 (1897).
' Prof. Hershey says the last treaty secured by hostages was that of
Aix la Chapelle; 1745. Hershey's International Law 319n. In the present
war civilians are constantly held as hostages for the good conduct of their
neighbors.
*The Pledge Idea, supra; Kohler's Philosophy of Law (Amer. Ed.)
i58; 2 Pollock & Maitland Hist. 184.
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hostage should be handed over to him as soon as the contract was
made. He contented himself with the promise that the hostage
would present himself as the first summons at the place which was
appointed beforehand, or which should be designated afterwards,-
a town, a castle, or an inn,-and from which place he was forbid-
den to depart until the debt should be paid. The laws seldom had
to see to the carrying out of this promise, because it was made a
point of honor to keep it; and, if necessary, excommunication would
have had satisfaction from the recalcitrant hostage (perjury or
quasi-perjury) or else he would have been taken by force (inter-
vention of the magistrates). Shutting up in prison was the natural
penalty for the infraction of this order; Beaumanoir recommended
that one give the hostage who has suffered this punishment better
nourishment than is furnished to prisoners for some crime. At the
same time, the hostage, and, as a consequence, the debtor, was
charged with the expenses occasioned by the sojourn of the former
in prison."s
For a long time it was the duty of members of the family to
act as surety for each other, an outgrowth of the earlier col-
lective liability of the family, and, in the middle ages, according
to some customs, the vassal was expected to act as pledge for
his lord."' Not to protect the surety against liability was a gross.
breach of faith that in time afforded grounds for rigorous legal
proceedings. Modern suretyship like the modem law of col-
lateral security developed through the progress of legal ideas, in
proportion as the payment of debts become better assured
through the growing power of the state, and the higher ethics
of trade relations due to commercial development. The moral
emphasis is transferred to the promise, the debtor's liability be-
comes more and more conspicuous, and the surety is forced into
the background, his liability becoming accessory. As to the
creditor, the more secure his position becomes, the less inclined
he will be to undertake what is in essence a preliminary execution
involving onerous duties on his part; self-help becomes a burden
'Brissaud's History of French Private Law (Continental Legal His-
tory Series) 574, where the authorities will be found collected. Laws of
King Aelfred, Sec. 4; Thorpe, 157.
" Coutume de Normandie (1727) 172; Laws of Gortyn, Sec. 11, 2 Law
Quarterly Rev. 150; Brissaud 573. Laws of King Edward, Sec. 9, Thorpe
165; Judicia Civitatis Lundoniae, Sec. 2, 3 Thorpe 243; Leges Henrici Primi,
Sec. 44, Thorpe 544. The Charter of Bristol provided that no burgess
should be forced to replevy any one, although dwelling on his land, Bor-
ough Customs (S.S.) 101.
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when legal protection is at -hand. As is well known, the modem
mortgagee rarely avails himself of his legal title except as a last
resort.
Roman law had a complex but highly developed system of
suretyship, the last phase of which is embodied in the legislation
of Justinian and survives with comparatively little change in
modem Continental codes. This system, the later stages of
which can be traced in the legal literature of the Empire, was
of slow growth, but its early history is obscure, as is, indeed, the
case with most of the law of the Republic. Five forms of this
contract are mentioned, namely: Sponsio, fidepromiso, fidejussio,
constitutum, and mandatum.11  Of these the two first were the
most ancient, becoming obsolete under the Empire. A sponsor
could intervene only where the parties were Roman citizens,
and the obligation was created by stipulation; the formal verbal
contract of the ancient civil law, the solemn question and answer
(spondes? spondeo), the origin of which is uncertain 12 but
probably religious in character, representing a kind of self-pledge
to the gods.13 Fidepromiso was somewhat later but still very
ancient and was used when one of the parties was an alien
(peregrinus). It too was verbal (promittis? promitto). Under
neither of these forms was the. heir of the surety bound and
both were much restricted by early statutes of unknown date.
By the lex Furia the liability of both sponsors and fidepromissors
was limited to two years and each surety was liable only for his
'See Gains (Poste's Ed.) III, xio-i27; Inst. Justinian (Moyle's Ed.)
III, 2o; Dig. 46; Hunter's Roman Law (3d Ed.) 565. There were other
forms of suretyship, such as the ancient praedes and vades connected with
litigation whose position is a matter of controversy. Buckland's Elements
of Roman Law, 257. So in every case of correal or solidary obligation in
which there was a right of contribution.
' Muirhead's Roman Law (3d Ed.) 39.
Sohm's Institutes (3d Ed.) 64. In the note it is said: "Sponsio was
the name originally given to a contract concluded by a libation, i: e., by a
formal self-denunciation, to the following effect: Even as this wine now
flows, so may the punishing Gods cause the blood of him to flow who shall
be the first to brear this covenant." By later law it was immaterial what
words were used provided an obligatory consensus was expressed in due
form. In the later Empire writing became as a matter of fact a requisite
of stipulation, a change due to Greek influence. It was therefore sufficient
if a written memorandum (cautio) was drawn up attesting that a promise
had been made in the form of a stipulation.
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proportionate share of the debt secured; the lex Apuleia gave
an action against the co-sureties by one who had paid more than
his share; the lex Cicereia required the creditor to inform each
surety before he became bound as to the amount of the debt
and the number of sureties.14
Fidejussio, as a form of suretyship came into use during
the later years of the Republic and marks a step in advance.
While usually made in the form of a verbal stipulation, it was
wider in its operation than the older forms and might be acces-
sory to obligations of every kind, whether contracted re, verbis,
litteris or consensu.15 A fidejussor bound his heirs, and, as
the lex Furia did not apply to fidejussores, where there were
several sureties each was liable for the whole debt, until a rescript
of the Emperor Hadrian gave the beneficium divisionis, by which
a surety sued for the whole debt could claim to have the debt
divided proportionately among the solvent sureties.16 The
practice also grew up of inducing the creditor at the time of
payment to cede to the paying surety his rights against the
debtor, the co-sureties, and any securities he might hold. This
practice developed into a rule of law, probably in the first cen-
tury of the Empire,17 the payment being treated not as a dis-
charge but as a purchase of the debt. To this beneficium ceden-
darum actionum the surety was entitled before payment, but
the cessio had to be secured before payment, otherwise the debt
was extinguished and could no longer be assigned. Finally,
Justinian established the beneficium ordinis or discussionis
(sometimes excussionis) which entitled the surety to demand
that the creditor should sue the principal debtor before resorting
to him, unless the debtor was out of the jurisdiction; in which
"There is no certainty about the dates of these leges. They are earlier
than Sulla. Buckland 258. The dates usually given are lex Furia, B. C. 9s;
lex Apuleia, B. C. 39o, 230 or io2; lex Cicereia, B. C. 173. Hunter, 61.
1. Just. Inst. III, 2o; Gains Inst. III, rig; The appropriate Latin
formula was, "Idem fide nea esse jubeo," but it probably was not insisted
on exactly. Sandar's note to Just. Inst., Secs. III, 20, 7.
.' Gains, Inst. III, 121; Dig. 46, r, 26-28
" Moyle's Just. Inst. (5 Ed.) 426 fl. Dig. 46, 1, 17, Dig. 46, x, 36; Di&
46, 3, 76. Buckland, 259. Independently of this right a fidejuaor who paid
had an actio mandati against the debtor.
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case unless the surety produced him within a time fixed by the
court, he must discharge the obligation.'
There were two other modes by .which the relation of
principal and surety might be produced. First, Constitutum, an
informal agreement to discharge the debt of another on a fixed
day made actionable by the praetor, but limited, before Justinian,
to promises relating to res fungibles.19 Second, Mandatum qual-
ificatum, that is, where one person (mandator) requested another
(mandatarius) to lend money to a third person, an obligation
arose on the part of the first to indemnify the creditor against
loss. In most respects a mandator stood almost exactly in the
place of a fidejussor and the two are treated under the same
headline ifi Digest and Code.20  But there were peculiarities due
to the very fact that it was a form of mandatum (the nearest
approach that Roman law made to the idea of agency in con-
tract) and that the contract which created the surety's liability
was wholly distinct from that of the debtor.21 Under both of
these forms of suretyship the beneficia already mentioned were
allowed.
By the Senatus-Consultum Velleianum which was passed
about A. D. 46, women were fbrbidden from acting as sureties
or giving their property as security for another. 22 There were
however some exceptions to this law and .the matter was further
regulated by Justinian in a manner that need not be entered into
here.
Rome, therefore, had faced the chief problems of- surety-
ship, had stripped the subject of early formalism and has estab-
lished the doctrines that delimit the topic in Continental Juris-
prudence.23 But immediate progress in this branch of the law,
'Nov. 4, i, modified as to bankers by Nov. 136. i.
"Dig. 13, 5. i; Dig. 13, 5, 28; Cod. 4, 18, 1; Hunter.(3 Ed.') 566.
" Dig. 46, I; Cod. 8, 4L
'Sandar's Just. Inst. (9 Ed.) III, 26, 5.
" Dig. I6, 1. See also Cod. 4, 29, 22-25; Nov. 134, 8.
i Pothier on Obligations (Evans) 294; Vinnius, lib. 3, tit 21; Her-
ingius de Fidejussoribus; Voet, lib. 46, tit. i; Schuster's German Civil Law
317; German Civil Code, Sec. 965 et seq.; French Civil Code, Sec. 2011 et
seq.; Las Siete Partidas, lib. V, Ut. 12; Erskine's Principles of the Law
of Scotland (21 Ed.) 431; Louisiana Code, Art. 3035 et seq.; Porto Rico
Civil Code, Sec. 1723 (Rev. Stat. 4829).
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as in others, was retarded by the fall of the Western Empire and
the influx of new peoples of varied development but all relatively,
less civilized than the conquered provinces. Thenceforth, it is
needless to say, the growth of European !aw was partly through
the natural development of native institutions to meet new
conditions, and partly through the absorption of Roman law
owing to its intrinsic merits and through the overpowering influ-
ence of Latin culture upon the mediaeval mind. During all this
period suretyship played a most important part and no subject
better illustrates the constant shifting of the juridical point of
view to meet social and economic changes of which the lawyers
and laymen of the time were scarcely conscious. Security,
heavily exacted, was the one stabilizing element in a period of
lawlessness, making business possible and strengthening the
weak arm of justice. Whatever the name, ancient or modem,
fidejussio,24 fiadura,25 garendia,2 6 plegerie,27 or cautionment,28 it
was an essential part of the mechanism of mediaeval procedure.
Security was taken at every step. Indeed, long after they had
ceased to be indispensable John Doe and Richard Roe continued
to add their immortal names to an endless series of writs as
pledges of prosecution. To a thriving orderly community pro-
tection so afforded becomes an irritating formality. But the
Continental field is too large for this brief review of accessorial
obligations which must presently turn to the common law of
England. The variety of customs makes generalizing dangerous,
but in -the process of growth certain definite, successive stages
may be noted. The hostage idea yields to that of the fidejussor;
"Bracton, II, 122; Cujas, Tom. 4, p. 959.
'Las Side Partlidas, lib. V, tit. 12.
Du Cange.
Brissaud 571. "In modern times we use the word pledge when a thing
is given by way of security. But, throughout the middle ages such a thing
is a gage, a vadium. On the other hand the word pledge, which answered
for the Anglo-Saxon borh, was reserved for cases in which there was what
we now call suretyship. The plegius was a surety. Thus, the common
formula pone per vadium et salvos plegios would, according to the modern
use of words, become; "exact a pledge and safe sureties." 2 Pollock &
Maitland, 183 note.
"French. The-person by whom the obligation is given is called caution.
In Scotland the contract is called a cautionary obligation and the surety
a cautioner. Bell's Dictionary.
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physical restraint to pecuniary liability; but the surety is the
sponsor for,29 the representative of the creditor and stands be-
tween debtor and creditor.30  Slowly this primary liability
becomes secondary in law as in intention, although not without
checks, for the skillful conveyancer will use the joint and sev-
eral obligation to bind the parties in solido.3 ' But in the end the
undertaking is commonly accessorial, particularly in the large
and increasingly important class of mercantile transactions
based on mutual credit. Roman law offers to this end its no-
menclature and rationale; the law merchant, the cosmopolitan,
expansive element, capable of overwhelming local conservatism.
In Saxon and Norman England the surety (bori, plegius,
fidejussor), is an almost indispensable factor in most legal trans-
actions; men are warned not to buy without pledges or wit-
nesses; 32 everyone must be prepared to furnish security.3 3  The
customs are sufficiently advanced to regard the surety as a debtor.
If one accused runs away,then, says the law of King Ethelred, "let
the borh pay to the accuser his ceapgild, and to the lord his wer,
who is entitled to his wite." 34 There are grim reminders of the older
practice; 35 the laws speak of one who has committed himself
'The sponsor in baptism still stands in the place of the child. 2
Phillimore, Ecclesiastical Law (2 Ed.) 488.
'In early days the transaction is visualized though the mysterious
symbolism of the festuce or vadium, the wand passed from debtor to credi-
tor and then from creditor to surety.- Wigmore, The Pledge Idea, io Harv.
L. Rev. 321; 2 Pollock & Maitland Hist. 184: Jenks, Law and Politics of
the Middle Ages, 266.
="Among the thousands of fair bonds discovered at Ypres there are
but few in which debtors are bound only for their own part, and when this
is the case the responsibility of each debtor is defined most scrupulously.
As a general rule where there is more than one debtor in these bonds
the debtors bind themselves 'chascun por le tout,' and when there were
several sureties in the same way each was surety for the whole debt:'
Mitchell, The Law Merchant, I2o.
'Laws of King Ethelred, I, 3 (Thorpe 283; Leges Edward's Confes-
sors, 38 (Thorpe 461); Laws of William the Conqueror, io (Thorpe 492);
Glanvill X, 3. From borh comes borrow.
'Laws of King Edgar, I, 6 (Thorpe 269); Laws of King Ethelred
I, i (Thorpe 28); Leges Edwardi Confessoris 18 (Thorpe 449); Laws of
William the Conqueror, i4 (Thorpe 493) ; Leges Henrici Primi, 8, 2 (Thorpe
5I5); 4 Blackstone IIS, frankpledge, 2 Holdsworth's Hist. 92.
"Laws of King Ethelred I, I (Thorpe 283). See Liber Albus (1.S.)
I, 115.
Holne's Common Law 248 et seq.
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into the power of another as surety; 3G the Mirror of Justice, if
it may be trusted, says that King Knut used to judge mainper-
nors as though they were principals when the latter did not
appear in court, but King Henry I limited this rule to main-
pernors who consented to the flight. In 1359 Justice Shard
after stating that bail are the prisoner's keepers (gardeyns) adds
that some say that they shall be hanged (pend). 38  Coke hastens
to explain that this was spoken in terrorem;39 but the old
notion may be traced in the common form of bail bond in felony,
binding the bail "body for body," an expression which the
books state is not to be taken literally.40 These, however, are
but land-marks; suretyship was a contract when Glanvill wrote,
the one important contract not to be classed as a real contract.41
Neither Glanvill nor Bracton in their references to surety-
ship state how the agreement was formed.42 Their respective
accounts of contract are colored by Roman phraseology and have
had little influence. Disputes about debts were usually deter-
mined in the local courts. No doubt there was a traditional
formula, a pledge of faith, a ceremony in the presence of wit-
nesses which was- sufficiently familiar to their contemporaries
and satisfied the human craving for orderly transactions until
the deed was adopted as the formal contract of the law. . It is
Leges Henrici Primi 89, 3 (Thorpe rq8), Laws of King Ine, 62 (Thorpe
143).
0 Mirror of Justices (S.S.) IV, 16, 2. The Mirror also states, V, 3147,
"It is an abuse to suppose that the same punishment should be awarded to
mainpernors as to the principals who make default, for in some cases the
former should only be amerced."
I Fitzherbert Abr., Mainprise, 12 (Hil 33 Edw. III) Mirror of Justices
(S.S.) I, 24. By the custom of London mainpernors committed to prison
because their principals are not found are to be set at liberty when the
principals are arrested. Liber Albus (Riley), 178.
.4 Inst. 178.
*Dalton's Justice (1727) 633; Highmore, Bail, 199, 2 Hale P. C. 125;
2 Hawkins P. C., Chap. 15, Sec. 83; Y. B. 21. Hen. VII, 20, pl 3. In Rex
v. Dalton, 2 Stra. 911 (1731) in taking bail for manslaughter Lord Chief
Justice Raymond said, "it was a mistake to imagine the bail were to be
hanged if the principal ran away-but that the method is to amerce them:"
Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, II, 47.
"Glanvill, Bk. io, Ch. v; Bracton, Bk. 3, Ch. 2, Sec. 2; Britton, Bk, 1,
Ch. 2%9, Sec. 4.
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clear that a verbal agreement was long sufficient. 43  Indeed, it was
not till the reign of Edward III that it was settled finally that
the surety's undertaking should be evidenced by a sealed instru-
ment, except where local custom preserved the old law.4 4 But
long before its supremacy was established the deed was in com-
mon use as a safe conveyance. John of Oxford's form book
contains an interesting precedent; the obligor, in respect to cer-
tain loans which took place in 1274 acknowledges that he is
bound to W and that he has "found sureties A, B, C, who have
constituted themselves principal debtors along with me for the
said monies." 4 This form was subjected to an early test in
Buckland v. Leanore.46 The plaintiff had entered into an agree-
ment with Peter the Mason that the latter should erect two
mills for him within a certain time. The agreement recited that
Roger Leanore and three others were added for greater security
(greignour surte), each of whom made himself severally respon-
sible for performance. Covenant was now brought against
Leanore. Leanore's counsel raises the point that his client is not
bound. "Cambridge. We ask now for judgment, seeing that
you counted that Roger and the others were bound, in which you
are not supported by your written agreement, for the writing
423 Holdsworth's Hist. 321. In somewhat earlier days men will be
found offering God as their surety, Laws of King Aelfred, 33, Thorpe 83,
2 Pollock & Maitland I9I; Leges Wallicae, Lib. II, Ch. 5, Secs. 4, 5 (Wot-
ton 14). Less selfish than the Egyptian practice of pledging a parent's
mummy. Herodotus II, I36.
According to the Rye custumal one having no gage or pledge if he
be of the franchise, "shall put his faith and truth upon the mayors
mace; but if he be a foreign stranger, he shall put his faith and trutn upon
the bailiff's rod." Borough customs (S.S.) Vol. I, 97.
"Homes', Common Law, 26o-264. In 13r4 the point was raised but not
pressed, Y. B. 7 Edw. II, f. 242. In 1344 the question was again raised
without decision. Y. B. I8 Edw. III, I3, pl. 7. In 1370 in debt on a prom-
ise to pay if another did not, the plaintiff took nothing because he did not
have a specialty. Y. B. 44 Edw. III, 21, pl. 23. But by the custom of
London debt would lie against pledges without specialty. Y. B. 43, Edw.
III, ii. pl. r; Bohun's Privilegia Londoni (3723) 77. See also Exeter
Custumal, Cap. 3o. Borough Customs, ioi.
"A conveyancer in the Thirteenth Century, Maitland, 7 Law Quarterly
Rev. 63.
" Eyre of Kent (S.S.) Vol. II, 9 (circa 1313-14). See in accord
Fitzherbert Abr., Obligacion 16; Perkins Profitable Book 33. Fitzjohn V.
Anon, Eyre of Kent (S.S.) Vol. II, 51, is an action of debt against pledges
by deed. See also Y. B. 33 Edw. I (Rolls Ed.) 86.
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says that 'for further security I add such and such ones', etc.
Consequently it is Peter alone who is speaking, and not Roger;
and we ask judgment. Spigurnel, J. If a man by a writing
confesses himself indebted to us, and the writing goes on to say
'and for. further security I procure such a one who binds him-
self,' and this latter affixes his seal to the writing, how can you
argue that he does not say the same thing as the other man
says? He affirms it by the fact of affixing his seal; and so you
must answer to the deed."
But the conveyancers soon tighten the surety's chain by
making him a principal party to the covenant, as may be seen
in an action of covenant brought in 1365 against W on a lease
to R by which R and W had bound themselves "et quilibet eorum
per se." Candish argued that the action did not lie against the
pledge without showing default by R. To which Belknap re-
plied that by the deed W was a principal. Wichingham, J., de-
clared that in debt against a pledge the default of the principal
debtor must be shown, but here there were certain things to be
done under the lease that had not been done, that time for
performance had passed, and there was nothing further to
demand. Whereupon Candish passed on to another point.
47
Once the binding force of the specialty is established, the future
of formal contracts of suretyship is readily settled on a basis that
affords small opportunity for the presentation of the surety's in-
dividual claims. The bond, or bill obligatory as it is some-
times called, becomes the standard form for such an agree-
ment.4" The substance of the transaction is that surety and
debtor are bound as co-principals to equal performance of a
joint or joint and several contract; their relations with the
creditor are thereafter determined largely by the rigorous rules
of the common law pertaining to joint or joint and several
"Y. B. 40 Edw. III, 5, pl. ii. See also Y. B. 39 Edw. III, 9, pl. 14.
* "Ad quam. quidem solutionem bene et fideliter faciendam, obligamus
nos et quemlibet nostrum per se, pro toto et in solido, haeredes, executores,
et administratores nostros per praesentes. In cuiue rei testimoniuni &c.'
West's Symboloegraphy (1632) ioi. See also Enchiridion Clericalis, 71;
The Compleat Clark (x664) 303; Y. B. 8 Hen. VI, 35.
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obligations, which must still be taken into account in so far as
they have not been altered by modern legislation.
49
Sureties who have discharged the debt, says Glanvill, may
have recourse to the principal by action of debt,50 and this is
borne out by Bracton's Note Book where it also appears, in a
case reported from Essex in 1223, that the defendant may wage
his law.51 If the surety is wise he obtains a counter-bond of
indemnity, as in Wroteham v. Canewold,52 a practice still fol-
lowed by prudent persons. A pledge, however, observes Glan-
vill, who has been amerced cannot recover from the principal.53
Indeed it required a clause in Magna Charta54 to give sureties
of the king's debtors the benefit of process to compel reimburse-
ment, a favor not extended to bail in criminal proceedings, since
this, in the words of Mr. Justice Bradley, "would relieve them-
from the motives to exert themselves in securing the appear-
ance of the principal." 55
"See further, as to some incidents of joinder i Parsons on Contracts,
Ch. 2, Sec. 2. Hening's Cases on Suretyship, Part I, Ch. i, Sec. 3; Part Ill,
Ch. i; Spencer on Suretyship, Sec. i99.
e Glanvill, Bk. iO, Ch. 5.
'Bracton's Note Book, Vol. III, p. 499, pl. 1641. Hugo de Lectona
sues Robert de Suttona in debt because Radulfus Bacun loaned money to
Robert upon Hugo's pledge and Hugo was distrained to render the same to
Radulfus for Robert. Robert comes and defends, denying that Hugo was
his pledge or paid anything for him. Therefore it is considered that he
defend himself twelve handed and come such a day with his law. See
also case pl. 1969 in same volume.
Y. B. 4 Edw. II (S.S.) 147 (131).
Glanvill, supra. Mirror, Bk. 2, Sec. 24 (S.S.), p. 63. But compare
select cases on the Law Merchant, Vol. i, pp. 6, 48.
"9 Hen. III, Chap. 8: "Neither we nor our bailiffs will seize the lands
or rents of a debtor for any debt so long as his goods are sufficient to ray
the debt nor shall the pledges of the debtor be distrained as long as the
principat debtor ig sufficient for the payment of the debt.. And if the
principal debtor fail in payment of the debt, having nothing wherewith to
pay, or will not pay where he is able, the pledges shall answer for the
debt And if they will, they shall have the lands and rents of the debtor
until they be satisfied of that which they before paid for him, except that
the debtor can show himself to be acquitted against the said sureties." 2 Co.
Tnst. 2o; King v. Bennet; Wightwick I (I8Io); Manning's Exchequer
Practice, Chap. IX.
"United States v. Ryder, iNo U. S. 729 (1184). An agreement to
indemnify bail is contrary to public policy. Consolidated E. & F. Co. v.
Musgrave (igoo). i Ch. 37; Mayne y. Fidelity Co., 8 Pa. D. R. 711 (i89g).
Contra Maloney v. Nelson, 158 N. Y. 35r (1899). In England the parties
to such an agreement have been held guilty of conspiracy. King v. Porter
(igio) i K. B. 369.
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There was in the register an ancient writ, expressly in-
tended for the relief of sureties; the writ de plegiis acquietandis,
by which, as Fitzherbert describes it, the surety who had paid
could summon the debtor to acquit him of the sum whereof he
had put himself in pledge.5 If this action had developed further,
at least one phase of the history of suretyship would have been
different. But the spirit of the age was unfavorable. It was
held that when two were jointly and severally bound for the debt
of one and the surety was sued and paid the debt, he could
not have de plegiis acquietandis. For the writ did not lie "with-
out express naming of surety or fidejwrsor in the writing. And
here the two obligors are proper debtors by their bonds and not
surety the one for the other." 17 Little more is heard of de
plegiis acquietandis with its latent capacity for developing the
surety's equities in a common-law form. Legal ingenuity was
directed toward safeguarding the interests of the investor and
was not concerned with the legitimate claims of the pledge.
As Sir George Cary puts it in a nutshell: "This grew trouble-
some to the creditor and therefore it fell in use that the pledge
should be bound as principal, and so by common law he is
chargeable, notwithstanding the sufficiency of the principal."58
Nor was the surety conceived of as possessing any rights as
against his co-sureties. In Wormleighton and Hunter's Case5 9
the Court of Common Pleas issued a prohibition, forbidding
the Court of Requests from proceeding with a bill for contribu-
tion by one surety against another, "because by entering into
the obligation it became the debt of each of them jointly and
MFitzherbert Natura Brevium, i31; Registrum Brevium, x58; 2 Co. Inst.
2o; Viner's Abr., Pledges (i). See Y. B. 43 Edw. III, 11; Y. B. 48 Edw.
III, 29; Coxe v. Thomas, Dyer 257 (1566). Fitzherbert thinks the writ
rests on Magna Charta, Ch. 8, supra, but this seems improbable as the writ
is found in the oldest registers. Maitland, Register of Writs, 2 Anglo Amer.
Leg. Hist. 566.
"Dyer 370 (158o). "Ideo &c comment que fuit trove p. verdict qd.
querens posuit in pleg. pro def. versus le dette, uncore il ne poit aver Judg-
ment." In time the word surety annexed to the name is merely a statement
of the relation of the parties bound inter se. Riley v. Jarvis, 46 W. Va. 43
(1896); Attorney Gen. v. Atkinson, I Y. & J. 2o7 (1827).
M Anonymous, Gary 12 (1557-1602). In Scott v. Stephenson, i Lev.
71 (1662), the wrif is mentioned as "perhaps" available. Compare At-
torney Gen. v. Resby, Hard. 377 (z664).
Ggodbolt 24 (x613).
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severally, and the obligee had his election to sue which of them
he pleased and take forth execution against him: and the court
said, that if one surety should have contribution against the
other, it would be a great cause of suits,"-a time-honored
judicial phrase for disposing of a troublesome point, for London
seems to have had no difficulty in enforcing contribution in the
Hustings Court under the ancient custumal of the municipality.60
If the terms of the surety's obligation were severe, the law
was impartial, at least to the extent of permitting him to stand
upon the very letter of his contract. The rule in Pigot's Case"'
that a material alteration avoided a deed was extended and
applied to the case of sureties upon simple contracts not under
seal,8 2 establishing the principle that any material variation of
the terms of a contract of suretyship without the consent of the
surety discharged the latter from liability. Mr. Justice Wash-
ington has stated the doctrine succinctly: The surety is not
bound by the contract as it is no longer the same but a different
contract; in its altered form he is no party to it; it cannot be
split into parts so as to be his contract to a certain extent and
not for the residue. Neither is it of any consequence that the
alteration is trivial, nor even that it is for the advantage of the
surety. Non haec in foedera veni, is an answer in the mouth
of the surety from which the obligee can never extricate his
case, however innocently, and by whatever kind intentions to all
parties he may have been actuated.6 3 The rule that a binding
"Liber Albus, Bk. III, pt. i (Riley) 183; Bohun's Privilegi a Londoni
(1723) 77; Offley and Johnson's Case, 2 Leon. 166 (1584). So where
a surety pays, and has no counter-bond, by the custom he may sue the
principal, Layer v. Nelson, i Vern. 456 (1687).
ai Co. 26 b (1614). See also Mathewson's Case, 5 Co. 22 b (1596);
Bayly v. Carford, March 125 (1641); Seaton v. Henson, 2 Shower 28
(1678); Viner's Abr., Faits (U); Crediton v. Exeter (i9o5) 2 Ch. 455;
Hilliboe v. Warner, 17 N. Dak. 594 (19o8).
"Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320 (1791); Davidson v. Cooper, ii M. &
W. 778 (1843), Aff. 13 M. & W. 343; Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall 8o (1867); s. c.
Ames' Cases on Suretyship 244 and notes.
' Miller v. Stewart, 4 Washington C. Ct. 26 (1820), affirmed 9 Wheat.
68o (1824). Accord, Walsh v. Bailie, io Johns i8o (x813); Witcher v. Hall,
5 B. & C. 269 (1826); Mackay v. Dodge, 5 Ala. 388 (1843); Bethune v.
Dozier, 5 Ga. 235 (i851); Gen. Steam Nay. Co. v. Rolt, 6 C. B. N. S. 550
(1859); Stewart v. Brown, 9 Macph. (Ct of Sess.) 963 (1871); Nesbit
54 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
agreement between creditor and primary debtor to give time
to the latter, made without the surety's consent, will discharge
the surety is a well-known application of the general principle.
6 4
While suretyship by specialty was being moulded into the
form it was to preserve in all material respects until the present
time, a new and informal type of suretyship was developing
through the action of assumpsit. As the gist of that action was
deceit in breaking a promise on the strength of which the plain-
tiff had conferred benefit or suffered detriment, it followed that
if A sold goods to B on the faith of C's collateral promise to
pay if B did not, A might have an action on the case upon C's
promise. So it was decided in two well-known cases in the
reign of Henry VIII,6 5 introducing, as Professor Ames justly
remarks, "the whole law of parol guaranty."' 6 The develop-
ment of this doctrine and the effect upon it of the fourth section
of the Statute of Frauds has been learnedly discussed elsewhere
and need not be gone into here.67  Aside from the confusion
v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429 (1893) ; Page v. Krekey, i37 N. Y. 3o7 (1893) ; Ziegler
v. Hallahan, 131 Fed. 205 (1904); Cosford Union v. P. L., etc., Assn.,
io3 L. T. 463 (igio).
Nisbet v. Smith, 2 Br. Ch. 579 (1785); Rees v. Berrington, 2 Ves. p.
54o (I795); s. c. Hening's Cases on Suretyship 426 and notes. Halsbury's
Laws of Eng., Guarantee, Sec. 1036; Metzger v. Nova R. Co., 214 N. Y. 26
('9'S).
"Y. B. 12 Hen. VIII, II, pl. 3; Jordan's Case, Y. B. 27 Hen. VIII, 24, pl.
3; Doctor and Student, II, 24. In the published records of the Borough of
Nottingham, Vol. II, p. 173, there is a case of the year i44o0, in which
Langton complains of Etwall of a plea of deceit in that Etwall undertook
for Richard Raven that the latter should work for Langton until he had
served to the amount of seven marks paid to Richard by Langton upon the
surety of Etwall, which undertaking Richard had broken to the grievous
damage and deceit of Langton. Etwall pleads not guilty and they are at
issue. Contrast in debt Y. B. 371 Hen. VI, 8, pl. i8.
Ames' History of Assumpsit, 3 Select Essays in Anglo American Legal
History 273, reprinted from 2 Harv. L. Rev. i.
'" Parol Contracts prior to Assumpsit; Ames, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 252; A
New and Old Reading on the Fourth Section of the Statute of Frauds, Hen-
ing, 57 U. PA. L REv. 6II; Ames' Cases on Suretyship r; Hening's Cases
on Suretyship 112; Brandt on Suretyship, Chap. II; Spencer on Suretyship,
Chap. VI; Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. II, p. x84; Birkmyr
v. Darnell, I Salk. 27 (704); Hunt v. Bate, Dyer 272a (1567). In Germany
a contract of suretyship must be in writing, Civil Code, Sec. 766. So also In
France, if the amount involved exceeds 150 francs, Code Civil, Sec. 1341. In
Spain a mercantile guarantee must be in writing, Code of Commerce, Lib. II,
Tit. 9. By Dutch law a guarantee may be entered into by a judicial, notarial
or private instrument. Van der Linden's Institutes (Morice's Ed. 1914) 139.
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that arose from a general misunderstanding of the scope of the
action of debt, the problem is fundamentally difficult, depend-
ing on close questions of fact and a nice discrimination between
an original promise from which another than the promisor may
derive a benefit and a promise subsidiary to that of another.
It would be interesting to know what part the common-law
courts really played in the evolution of informal suretyships.
One may suspect that behind the legal phrasemaking, the strug-
gle for a formula, there was the steady pressure of mercantile
expediency. In the Tudor period commerce was expanding and
the nation was learning to think commercially, it was but a
matter of time until the jurisprudence of the Piepowder Court
would be transferred to the King's Bench. No part of the
history of English law is more obscure than that connected with
the Law Merchant68 but it is only reasonable to suppose that a
constantly increasing number of tradesmen were learning the
value of credit and accustoming themselves to the use of the
various forms of commercial paper introduced by the merchants
who frequented the cosmopolitan markets and fairs. Gerard
Malynes, Merchant, says: "If any merchant do passe his word
for another, it maketh him, as fidejussor, to perform the same,
and the act done before is a sufficient good consideration, and
they all agree that bona fides inter inercatores est servanda, faith
or trust is to be kept between merchants, and that also must be
done without quillets or titles of the law, to avoid interruption
of traffique."69  The bond may remain the conveyancer's vade
mecum but a more flexible form of accessorial contract was
necessary-indeed inevitable. It is significant that in Modern
English law "guarantee" has practically supplanted "suretyship"
as the generic term for contracts of an accessory nature."° It
Blackburn on Sales, 2o7.
-Lex Mercatoria, Chap. X, Of Suretyship and Merchant's Promises.
Malynes tells how a friend of his at the fair of Frankfurt had recommended
another merchant and had been held liable under the Civil Law as a mandator.
I Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 294. By Roman Dutch Law, "the
assurance that a person is an honest and solvent man who will pay, does not
in itself amount to a guarantee." Van Der Linden's Institutes (Morice)
139. Bourke v. Buxton, 3 Transvaal 39 (1889). The German Civil Code,
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is true American cases frequently draw a distinction between
surety and guarantor, the responsibility of the former being
primary and direct; that of the latter secondary and collateral,
but the words are commonly used as if synonymous and the
courts are far from agreement as to the precise criteria for dis-
tinguishing the two classes of undertakings, or the consequences
of the distinction when made. Where the guaranty is of strict
payment or performance it is essentially a suretyship."1 The
distinction does not appear to have been taken elsewhere2 and
even in America there is no magic in the use of one word or
the other, the liability depending on the terms of the contract.
73
For most purposes it is sufficient to say, in the words of the
Indian Contract Act,74 a contract of guarantee is a contract
to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third
person.
Under so broad a definition, suretyship or guarantee will
necessarily include a variety of transactions often with distinc-
tive names. Lord Selborne distinguishes between three kinds of
cases: "(i) Those in which there is an agreement to consti-
tute, for a particular purpose, the relation of principal and
surety, to which agreement the creditor thereby secured is a
party; (2) those in which there is a similar agreement between
the principal and surety only, to which the creditor is a stranger;
and (3) those in which, without any such contract of suretyship,
there is a primary and secondary liability of two persons for
Sec. 7"78, provides that one who commissions another to give credit to a third
party in his own name is liable for the obligation arising from the credit
given. Compare as to tortions liability Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51 (1789) ;
Lyde v. Barnard, i M. & W. ioi (i863); Parsons v. Barclay Co., io3 L. T.
z96 (igio).
'Fell on Mercantile Guaranties; De Colyar on Guarantees; 15 Hals-
bury's Laws of England 439; 1 Smith's Mercantile Law (ioth Ed.) 567.
"'Brand on Suretyship, Sec. 2; Spencer on Suretyship, Sec. 3; Hening's
Cases, Chap. IV, Sec. .
'* Suretyship from Standpoint of Comparative Jurisprudence, H. A. De
Colyar, 6 Journal of Society of Comparative Legislation 46.
' Shore v. Lawrence, 68 W. Va. 22o (igio) ; Hartley S. Co. v. Berg, 48
Pa. Super. Ct 419 (igi1); J. W. Walkins M. Co. v. Loveaday, i86 Ala. 414
(1914).
T4 i87, Act IX, Chap. 8, Sec. 126.
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one and the same debt, the debt being as between the two, that
of one of those persons* only, and not equally of both, so that
the other, if he should be compelled to pay it, would be entitled
to reimbursement from the person by whom (as between the
two) it ought to have been paid."'7 5 It must always be remem-
bered that there is a marked difference between the juridic rela-
tion of the parties to a formal contract of suretyship or a true
mercantile guarantee and that of the parties to other supposedly
analogous contracts, such as endorsers of commercial paper,
indemnitors, and mortgagors who have sold the equity of re-
demption.76  The existence of a primary and secondary liability
does not of itself create a suretyship, although it frequently
confers a portion at least of the equities which the surety, as will
be shown, has definitely acquired. It was for the purpose of
obtaining the advantages of such equities that the similarity of
such obligations to true suretyship has been pressed on the
courts and partially conceded.
The recognition of the surety's equities is but an incident
in the story of law reform through the chancery, the earlier
chapters of which, owing to the absence of reports, are neces-
sarily obscure.77 There was pressure for relief before the extent
of the chancellor's power was defined. By the time the common-
law courts and chancery had established a modus zivendi and
equity jurisprudence had been systematized these equities were
recognized, seemingiy without question. To this result the
aretology of the clerical chancellors and the rationalism of their
lay successors contributed, each in its own way. But the para-
' Duncan, Fox & Co., v. North & S. W. Bank, (188o), 6 App. Cas. i.
" Endorsers: Stephens v. Bank, 88 Pa. 157 (1878); Tanner v. Gude,
ioo Ga. 457 (1897). Indemnitors: Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446 (895);
Harburg I. R. Co. v. Martin (i902), i K. B. 778; Tritten's Estate, 238 Pa.
555 (1913) ; Cotting v. Otis E. Co., 214 Mass. 294 (913) ; March v. Fidelity
Co., 79 Md. 309 (894); Champion Co. v. Amer. B. Co., 115 Ky. 863 (1903);
Lewis v. U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 144 Ky. 425 (i911). Mortgagors: Keller
v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 6Io (1889); Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1878);
Inglehart v. Crane, 42 IIl. 261 (1866). See also Suretyship at Law Merchant,
by Anan Raymond, 3o Harv. L. Rev. 141.
"t Barbour, Contract in Equity IV, Oxford Studies in Social and Legal
Hisory 66; I Holdsworth Hist. 242; Kerley's History of Equity, 146; Spence s
Eq. 638.
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mount factor was the economic and social progress of the
country. The day was passing when questions of ultimate right
could be disposed of on formal and external grounds alone. The
extension of commerce had broadened the science of accounting
and developed stricter and more searching theories of account-
ability.7 8 The level of culture attained was out of harmony with
the tenacious pedantry which left to chance, that is to the caprice
of the creditor, the final and absolute decision as to which of
several persons bound for a sum should bear the whole respon-
sibility alone, in defiance of sound principles of morals and jur-
isprudence which would place the burden on the primary debtor
or distribute it among co-obligors equally liable.
The most obvious equity of the surety is to be indemnified
or reimbursed for the loss sustained through his principal's de-
fault. It has been shown quite conclusively that the contract
of indemnity had obtained recognition in chancery in the fif-
teenth century,79 and the claim to relief was exceptionally strong
where the surety had become bound on the faith of the debtor's
promise. The matter could not be put more plainly than in one
of these ancient bills where the chancellor is asked to consider,
"how that reason and good. conscience wold that, sith your seid
besecher was for and by the said Thomas Oldebury (the de-
fendant and promisor) put in charge that the same Thomas
should him discharge."' 0 In Ford v. Stobridge the plaintiff was
bound as surety for the defendant and the debt was recovered
from him, "and he having no counter-bond brought his bill to
recover the debt and damages against the defendant which was
decreed."'" This right of the surety to be fully indemnified
against the loss arising out of his guarantee is admitted uni-
versally by European Codes 82 and, in the eighteenth century,
" Contribution or subrogation would have meant little in a community
that reckoned a man of age who could measure an ell and count up to
twelve. Y. B. 12-13 Edw. III (Rolls Series) 236.
"Barbour, Contract in Equity, i35. See particularly the case transcribed
page 222. Also Y. B. 8 Edw. IV, 4, pl. Ii.
'Barbour, supra.
Nelson 24 (1632) ; Viner's Abr. Surety (D) ; Tinsley v. Oliver, 5 Munf.
419 (1817).
'French Civil Code, Sec. 2028; German Civil Code, Sec. 775; Spanish
THE SURETY
was conceded finally by the common-law courts of England
when the surety was permitted to bring an action of assumpsit
against the principal as for money paid.to his use.8 3 The right
of the surety is not confined to cases where the creditor has
been paid. As soon as a definite sum has become payable the
surety may apply to a court of equity for a decree directing
the principal to pay the creditor, so that his own liability may
be brought to an end. In other words equity will compel the
debtor to exonerate his surety.8 4 Even on the other side of
Westminster Hall it was admitted that "terror of suit, so that
he dare not go about his business is a damnification, although he
be not arrested or forced by process." ' s5 But a decree will not
be made in respect to future contingent claims that have not
matured. 6
Closely related to the foregoing equities is that of subroga-
tion 7 or substitution. The surety as soon as he has paid the
creditor has a right to the beuiefit of all the securities which the
creditor has received from the principal whether known to him
or not at the time he became surety. 8 This right is the equiva-
Civil Code, Sec. x838; Van der Linden's In'st. (Morice) '4'; Erskines Prin-
ciple of Laws of Scotland (21st Ed.) 439; Burge on Suretyship, 357; 1 Pothier,
Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 277.
" Morrice v. Redwyn, 2 Barnard 26 (1 31) ; Woffington v. Sparks, 2 Ves.
Sr. 569 (754); Decker v. Pope, i Selwyn N. P. (13th Ed.) 9i (,757); Tay-
lor v. Mills, Cowp. 525 (1777); Toussaint v. Martinnant, 2 T. R. ioo (1787),
at p. io5; Barclay v. Gooch, 2 Esp. 571 (797); Pownal'v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C.
439 (1827).
" Barbour, Contract in Equity, supra; Gighs v. Welby, i Calendars in
Chancery CXX, s. c. Ames' Cases on Suretyship 583; Saunders v. Churchill,
Toth. I8I (1613) ; Ranelaugh v. Hayes, i Vern. i89 (1683) ; Nisbet v. Smith,
2 Br. C. C. 578 (785); Autrobus v. Davidson, 3 Meriv. 569 (1817); Ardesco
Oil Co. v. Mining Co., 66 Pa. 375 (1870); Ascherson v. Tredegar D. & W.
Co. (I9o9), 2 Ch. 40; Southwestern S. I. Co. v. Wells, 217 Fed. 294 (1914).
Broughton's Case, 5 Co. 24a (i6oo). Suit on a counter-bond.
Hughes-Hallet v. Indian M. G. M. Co., (1882), 22 Ch. D. 561; Cotting
v. Otis Elevator Co., 214 Mass. 294 (1913).
An English and French term for substitution. Kelham, subroguer,
surroguer, surrogate. Merlin's Repertoire, Vol. 16, p. 451. Subrogation;
i Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 276; French Civil Code, Secs. 1249-
1252.
"Morgan v. Seymour, i Ch. R. 120 (1637) ; Doughty's Case, Wightw. 2
(1702) ; Parsons v. Briddock, 2 Vern. 6o8 (1708), s. c. i Eq. Cas. Abr. 93;
Webber's Case, Wightw. 2 (1718); Exp. Crisp, i Atk. 133 (i744); Walker
v. Preswick, 2 Ves. Sr. 622 (1755) ; Robinson v. Wilson, 3 Madd. 434 (1814) ;
.60 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
lent of the beneficiurn cedendarum actionum, of the Roman
law, which has its counterpart in the modern civil codes,89 and
exists, as stated by Lord Eldon, "not by force of the contract;
but that equity, upon which it is considered against conscience,
that the holder of the securities should use them to the prejudice
of the surety."90  Hence a creditor who surrenders a security
thereby reduces his claim pro tanto against the surety.91 In
England, after some hesitation, it was settled by Lord Eldon
that the principle did not extend to such securities as were ipso
facto, extinguished in the payment.92  The opposite view, which
has prevailed generally in the United States, is more in accord
with the civil law, and the Mercantile Law Amendment Act of
1856 has put an end to Lord Eldon's doctrine in its home
jurisdiction.93  The same principle is applied against co-sureties
to the extent of their liability to contribute to the payment of
the debt. In Maure v. Harrison, in 1692, as reported, it is
said that a creditor shall have the benefit of collateral security
given by the principal to the surety, 4 and this rule is followed
in the United States on the theory that securities thus pledged
are held in trust for the ultimate payment of the debt as well
as the protection of the surety."5 But this doctrine has not met
with approval in the modem English decisions, which limit the
Mayhew v. Crickett, 2 Swanst. 185 (x88); Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. 123
(i8'9); Hodgson v. Shaw, 3 M. & K. 183 (834).
'French Civil Code, Sec. 2029; German Civil Code, Sec. 774; Erskine's
Principles of Law of Scotland (2ist Ed.) 439; Van der Linden's Institutes
(Morice) 14o.
" Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. 382 (i8o2); Duncan F. & Co. v. Bank (i88o),
6 App. Cas. i.
"Pearl v. Deacon, 3 Jurist N. S. 879 (I857), s. c. Ames' Cases 'gz. and
notes; Holland v. Johnson, 51 Ind. 346 (1875), s. c. Hening's Cases 471, and
notes.
Copis v. Middleton, T. & R.: z4 (1823).
'Lidderdale v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594 (1827). Croft v. Moore, 9
Watts 45r (i84o); Lumpkin v. Mills, 4 Ga. 343 (1848) ; Townsend v. Whit-
ney, 75 N. Y. 425 (1878); Note 68 L. R. A. 513, 19 & 20 ViCt 297, Sec. 5;
In re MrMyn, (1886), 33 Ch. D. 575.
"1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 93, P11 5; Wright v. Morley, ii Ves. 12 (I8O4), semble.
"Moses v. Murgatoyd, i Johns. Ch. II9 (1814); Chambers v. Prewitt,
172 Ill. 615 (1898) ; Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 6zo (i889). But the right
does not extend to collateral held by a surety from a stranger or a co-
surety, unless given in trust for the payment of the debt. Taylor v. Farmers'
Bank, 81 Ky. 318 (1888); Hampton v. Phipps, io8 U. S. 26o (1882).
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creditor's right to cases where a direct interest can be shown
or where both principal and surety are bankrupt. 96
The surety who has paid more thanf his share of the com-
mon liability is erititled to contributioh from his co-sureties, in
regard to the excess, in proportion to the amounts in which they
are respectively liable, the equity depending not on contract, but
upon equality of burden. 97  The principle is accepted in modem
Continental jurisprudence 9 s and was applied even at common
law in certain instances of joint liability, although not in the
case of co-sureties.99  It was said by Sir Lloyd Kenyon in
Lawson v. Wright 'oo that it had been established ever since the
origin of courts of equity that one surety had a right to call
on another for contribution, but there seem to be no reported
instances of this prior to the seventeenth century. Several
cases appear in the time of Charles I, and from that time the
principle may be regarded as settled.1" 1 Finally, a surety who
had paid more than his share was permitted to sue his co-surety
in assumpsit for money paid to his use.10 2  At law the co-surety
" Rowlatt's Principal and Surety, I92; Exp. Waring, 2 G. & J. 404 (1I5),
s. c. I9 Ves. 345; In re Walker (1892), I Ch. D. 621. See.also Reynolds v.
Fetherstonhaugh, (895), I Irish 182; Royal Bank of Scotland v. Commercial
Bank, (i882), 7 App. Cas. 366, and article by Mr. William Williams, i Har-
vard L. Rev. 326.
of Dering v. Winchelsea; 2 B. & P. 27o (1781); Davis v. Humphreys,
6 M. & W. 153 (x84o); Gross v. Davis, 87 Tenn. 226 (i88); Fidelity Co.
v. Phillips, 235 Pa. 469 (1912).
"Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 29I; French Civil Code, Sec.
2033; German Civil Code, Secs. 426, 774; Kroon v. Enschede (igog), Trans-
vaal Sup. Ct. 374.
nFitzherbert Nat Brev. 161; Harbert's Case, 3 Co. iib. (1584); Viner's
Abr. Contribution; Bacon's Abr. Chancery (Average). The custom of Lon-
don allowed contribution between co-sureties. See note 6o, supra.
lox Cox Ch. 27s (786).
'aPeter v. Rich, i Chan. Rep. 34 (1629-30); Fleetwood v. Charnock,
Nelson o (629-3o); s. c. Toth, 41; Morgan v. Seymour, i Chan. Rep. 12o
(1637-38); Swain v. Wall, i Chan. Rep. 149 (1642); Hole v. Harrison,
Finch i5 (1673); Harrison v. Lane, 5 Leigh 414 (1834). The plaintiff must
have paid more than his due proportion of the whole debt. Stirling v. Bur-
dett, (x9ii), 2 Ch. D. 418. As to exoneration, see Wolmerhausen v. Gullick
(I893), 2 Ch. D. 514, and compare Zachry v. Petersoni 171 S. W. 494 (Tex.
1914).
'Turner v. Davies, 2 Esp. 479 (796), semble; Cowell v. Edwards, 2
B. & P. 268 (i8oo); Brown v. Lee, 6 B. & C. 697 (1827); Judah v. Milure,
5 Blackf. (Ind. 1839); Kemp v. Finden, 12 M. & W. 421 (1844); Sloo v.
Pool, i5 Ill. 47 (1853).
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was liable only for his pro rata proportion taking into account
the whole number of sureties, whereas in equity the debt was
divided among the solvent sureties.103 But in England, under
the Judicature Act of 1873, the distinction is no longer of
practical importance, while in the United States there is a ten-
dency to apply the equitable rule in actions at law.10 4  How-
ever that may be, the jurisdiction by the Court of Chancery
remains undisturbed. Indeed the remedy by bill in equity is
far more convenient where there are complicated accounts and
a large number of persons involved. Under such circumstances
the proper course is to sue principal and co-sureties together in
chancery and have the rights and liabilities of all worked out
in one inquiry.10 5
Two other privileges, as stated above, were conferred upon
the surety by the Roman law. First, the benefit of division,
which arose where there were several sureties for the same debt
and one was sued for the whole. Under such circumstances, on
demand of the surety sued, the creditor was bound to divide
and apportion his claim among the solvent sureties. The benefit
is preserved under modern civil codes but it may be, and in
practice frequently is, renounced. 1 6 Indeed, such a renuncia-
tion may be implied from the nature of the undertaking accord-
ing to the modem view.107' This doctrine has not been received
in England or America. Opposed to the common-law theory
of joint and several liability in contract; treated on the con-
1"i Story's Eq., Sec. 496; De Colyar on Guarantees (2d Ed.) 307.
'Lowe v. Dixon, (I885), i6 Q. B. D. 455; Van Petter v. Richardson,
68 Mo. 379 (1878); Liddell v. Wiswell, 59 Vt. 365 (1887); Michael v. Al-
bright, 126 Ind. 172 (i8go); Smith v. Mason, 44 Neb. 61o (1895).
'Hitchman v. Stewart, 3 Drew. 271 (1855); Dysart v. Crow, 170 Mo.
275 (io2); Estate of Koch, 148 Wis. 548 (1912).
' French Civil Code, Sec. 2o26; Belgian Civil Code, Sec. 2026; Louisiana
Civil Code, Sec. 3o4g; Spanish Civil Code, Sec. 1837; Italian Civil Code,
Sec. i912; Norway, Commercial Laws of the World, Vol. 29, p. 37. Compare
Argentine Commercial Code, Sec. 48o, no benefit of division for guarantors
in commercial matters.
'TIn Bruce v. Lambour, 123 La. 969 (I9O9), the sureties were jointly
and severally bound and the benefit of division was refused under Sec. 2o94
of the Code. In Van der Vyver v. DeWayer, 4 Searle (Cape of Good Hope)
27 (x86i), it was held that sureties binding themselves as co-principals re-
nounced the beneficium divisionis as well as the beneficium ordinLs. In
Erskine's Principles of the Law of Scotland (21st Ed.) 439, it is said: "By
THE SURETY
tinent as an artificial survival of the early reception of Roman
law; dilatory in its operation, there was no. particular advantage
to be derived from- its introduction into a system that recog-
nized the right of contribution.
A second privilege is the benefit of discussion, recognized
in most countries that follow the rules of the civil law, by which
the creditor, on demand of the surety and at his expense, is
obliged first to proceed to execution against the property of
the principal debtor.108 Upon this benefit there are various re-
strictions. It does not apply to judicial sureties. 0 9  It may be
renounced and a renunciation is implied when the surety binds
himself as a co-debtor.1 0  It must be claimed when the surety
is first sued and the property available for seizure within the
jurisdiction must be indicated."' In Scotland the Mercantile
Law Amendment Act of 1856 has abolished the benefit of dis-
cussion in all cases where it is not expressly provided for." '2
This privilege also has never been formally recognized by
English or American law. To be sure, a contract may stipulate
that the principal shall be proceeded against before application
is made to the surety.rl 3 Such is the rationale of that line of
our law all the co-cautioners are usually bound in the same writing; so that
there is no place for this benefit." Compare i Bell's Commentaries 345. See
also i Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 269; I Domat's Civil Law (Stra-
ban, 2nd Ed.) 378.
'French Civil Code, Secs. 2or-2o24; Louisiana Civil Code, Sec. 3o46;
German Civil Code, Secs. 771-773; Spanish Civil Code, Secs. i83x-i836;
Italian Civil Code, Sec. 19o7. Also called beneficium excussionis and bene-
ficium ordsis, supra.
IN'i Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 263; French Civil Code, Sec.
2042
1 Domat's Civil Law (Strahan, 2nd Ed.) 378; German Civil Code, Sec.
773 (1); French Civil Code, Sec. 2021. In Van der Linden's Institutes
(Morice), note, p. 142, it is said that "in modern guarantees this is almost
always renounced by saying that the surety binds himself as surety and co-
principal debtor." See also Farthing v. Pieters (1912), South Africa, Cape
of Good Hope, 215.
'French Civil Code, Sec. 23; Louisiana Civil Code, Sec. 3047; Dwight
v. Lenton, 3 Rob. 57 (1842) ; Hill v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. 623 (1852); Mathews
v. Kemp, 27 La. Ann. 203 (1875); Schmidt v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 7
(C88) ; Ridley v. Anderson (gii), South Africa, Eastern Dist. 13.
312 I9-2o Vict. C. 6o, 68; Erskine's Principles (2ist Ed.) 438; Johannes-
burg v. Stewart, (i9og), S. C. H. L. 53.
" Holl v. Hadley, 2 Ad. & EL 758 (1835).
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American decisions which holds that a guarantee of collectibility
implies an effort to collect.11 4  Where, however, the undertak-
ing of the surety is absolute, then as soon as the principal is
in default the creditor has his remedy against both promisors,
or either if the obligation is joint and several; it is unnecessary
before proceeding against the surety to sue the principal al-
though solvent;115 it is unnecessary to resort to the securities
received from the principal for the guaranteed debt.' 6
The benefit of discussion is, in fact, an ineffective remedy
just described by Chancellor Kent as a dilatory exception useful,
indeed, to delay the creditor but incapable of affording affirma-
tive relief to the surety, since the creditor cannot be coerced into
proceeding against the debtor. "The law," says Pothier, "hav-
ing fixed the time in which a creditor may exercise his actions,
the surety cannot impose a shorter term upon him than that
which the law allows." 117 The equity of exoneration offers ade-
quate means to the surety for extricating himself from his diffi-
culties; under exceptional circumstances chancery may even com-
pel the creditor to resort to the collateral.118 But, ordinarily,
the surety holds the key to his own prison. He can live up to
his bargain, pay and obtain subrogation.11 9 The effect of the
early New York case of Pain v. Packard 120 is to authorize
"Foster v. Barney, 3 Vt. 6o (i83o); White v. Case, 13 Wend. 543
(1835) ; M'Doal v. Yeomans, 8 Watts 361 (1839) ; Sanford v. Allen, 55 Mass.
473 (1848); Craig v. Parkis, 4o N. Y. 181 (1869); Dutton v. Pyle, 195 Pa.
8 (igoo).
" Attorney General v. Resby, Hard. 371 (1664); Cutter v. Southern, i
Win. Saund. 115 (1667); Ker v. Mitchell, 2 Chitty 487 (1786); Rede v.
Farr, 6 M. & S. 121 (1817); Attorney General v. Atkinson, i .Y. & J. 2o7
(1827); In re Lockey, I Phillips 5o9 (1844); Queen v. Fay, (1878), 4 L R.
Irish 6o6; Bellows v. Lovell, 22 Mass. 307 (1827); Holcombe v. Fetter, 70
N. J. Eq. 300 (19o).
'Y. B. 16 Edw. IV, 9; Day v. Elmore, 4 Wis. 190 (i855); Jones v.
Tincher, 15 Ind. 308 (i86o); Nat Bk. of Newburg v. Smith, 66 N. Y. 271
(1876); Bingham v. Mears, 4 N. Dak. 437 (1894).
i i Pothier on Obligations (Evans' Ed.) 267.
'Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. 123 (18iq); P. & R. Co. v. Little, 41 N.
J. Eq. 519 (1886) ; St. Croix T. Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55 (Igo).
" Brick v. Freehold B. Co., 37 N. J. L. 307 (1875); Morrison v. Bank,
65 N. H. 253 (i88); Davis v. Patrick, 57 Fed. gog (1893).
1"I3 Johns. 174 (x8i5) followed in King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384
(i81g) reversing Chancellor Kent in 2 Johns. Ch. The reasoning upon
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the surety to notify the creditor to proceed against the principal,
and, if he fails to do so, and a loss occurs, the surety is dis-
charged. This innovation is supported by the decisions and
statutes of a few states, but the overwhelming weight of au-
thority is against it, as an arbitrary variation of the contract. 12 1
Certainly the creditor ought not to be compelled to proceed
against the principal in relief of the surety unless the latter
is prepared to indemnify the creditor against loss, as is the
practice in civil-law countries under the benefit of discussion.
In reconciling as far as possible the conflicting interests of cred-
itor and surety, care must be taken to do injustice to neither.
Gross negligence on the part of the creditor in dealing with
collateral security or favoritism toward the debtor at the surety's
expense should be punished by placing the loss on him through
whose wrongful conduct it was incurred. But in the interest
of borrowers even more than of lenders, it must be remembered
that the more safely credit can be extended the more easily it
will be obtained and that the best foundation for credit is the
control of assets easily liquidated. As long as the creditor does
not act oppressively, nothing is gained by building up an elab-
orate technique to hamper him in the order and manner in which
he may avail himself of his securities.
In recent years the most interesting questions. in the law
of suretyship have arisen through the advent of the incorporated
surety company. The older law assumed that, as between prin-
cipal and surety, the obligation was gratuitous, the motive
friendship or expectation of reciprocal advantage. In Scotland,
the lords of session in 1711 annulled, as contra bonos mores,
a bond given as compensation to a suretyA22 an old fashioned
which the judgment of Spencer, C. J., rests is that if the duty exists, there
is no reason why it may not be enforced by the act of the creditor without
the aid of equity. Accord, Wetzel v. Sponsler, i8 Pa. 460 (1852); Martin v.
Skehan, 2 Colo. 614 (1875) ; Jackson v. Huey, xo Lea. 184 (1882) ; Howle v.
Edwards, 97 Ala. 649 (1892); Brandt on Suretyship (3rd Ed.), Sec. 265.
m Taylor v. Beck, 13 Ill. 376 (185I); Frye v. Barker, 21 MVs. 382 (1826);
Bull v. Allen, ig Coun. ioi (1848); Thompson v. Bowne, 39 N. J. L. (1876);
Harris v. Newell, 42 Wis. 687 (1877), and the many cases cited in Ames'
Cases on Suretyship 222; Spencer on Suretyship, Sec. 172.
'King v. Ker, 2 Fountainhall's Decisions 631 (1711), s. c. 12 Morrison
Dict. 9461.
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view, for guarantors were paid with increasing frequency as
mercantile transactions assumed a broader scope. Nevertheless,
the professional bondsman is to this day viewed with suspicion.
While the common-law could not unmake the surety's contract,
it could, as ha been shown, take account of his disinterested-
ness by permitting him to stand on the very letter of his agree-
ment; the undertaking of the surety, to use the favorite phrase,
being regarded as strictissimi juris. The protection, given to the
surety under this rule before equity had ameliorated his lot,
was very similar to that given to the prisoner through the tech-
nical interpretation of indictments before the reform of the
criminal law and is unnecessary in the present state of the law;
a guaranty, like other contracts, should receive a reasonable
construction with a view to ascertaining and carrying into effect
the true intention of the parties. The trend of American de-
cisions is to distinguish between individual and corporate surety-
ship and to deny favors to the latter because the transaction is
essentially insurance, undertaken by companies organized to
conduct such a business for profit upon terms usually prescribed
by themselves.1 2 3  "The rule of strict construction," it is said
in a recent case,12 4 "is liable at times to work a practical in-
justice and it ought not to be extended beyond the reason for
the rule, particularly when the surety is engaged in the business
of becoming surety for pay and presumably for profit." It may
be questioned whether compensation is a proper criterion for
discriminating between agreements where the strictissimi juris
rule is sought to be applied. If the contract is based on an
elaborate questionnaire and is for all practical purposes an in-
'"Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416 (19o3); Young v.
American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373 (191o); Boppart v. Surety Co, 140 Mo.
App. 675 (I909); Champion I. Co. v. Amer. Bonding Co., 115 Ky. 863 (1903);
Lesher v. Fidelity Co., 239 Ill. 502 (igog); Whitestown v. Title Guaranty
Co, 72 N. Y. Misc. 498 (I911); Atlantic Trust Co. v. Laurinburg, 163 Fed.
6g (1go8); Philadelphia v. Fidelity Co., 231 Pa. 2o8 (I911), s. c. Ann. Cas.
(1912) io85, and note; 64 UNIV. OF PA. L. Rav. 2oo; Spencer on Suretyship,
Sec. 93; 32 Cyc. 3o6. But as to statutory and judicial bonds, see Brandt on
Suretyship (3rd Ed.), Sec. 15.
St. John's College v. Aetna Indemnity Co.. 201 N. Y. 335 (9I).
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surance policy, it should be so treated. But, where the contract
of the compensated surety is not essentially different from that
of the gratuitous surety, the same rules of interpretation should
be applied to both, based on a fair and reasonable construction
of their respective obligations. The distinction is, no doubt, in
part due to a reluctance to admit that the rule of strictisimi
juris has little justification in modem law and may prove the
entering wedge for its repudiation. Surety companies it is
needless to say are a convenience to the public; it is important
that they continue sound and that their rates be as moderate as
is commensurate with the risk, and the risk will be lessened by
a wise, consistent, and uniform administration of the law of
guaranty in all cases.
From the dungeon of the kinsman hostage to the well-fur-
nished office of the modern bonding company may appear too
long and circuitous an excursion to be condensed into so brief
a narrative; perhaps, to the romantically minded it may seem
to result in an anti-climax. But the story has a unity of its own
with a conclusion of general application, were epilogues the fash-
ion. Here is displayed one small phase of the struggle for co-
operation that has characterized human progress. For the lia-
bility that falls so heavily on the individual the ancient corrective
is sacrifice, the foundation of generous instincts which have per-
manently influenced ideas of propriety, but amount to no more
than a shifting of the burden from one individual to another.
The joint pledge of faith marks an advance; taken in concert
by the co-promisors, there is identity of risk, but it is coupled
with a moral obligation, that in time becomes a legal duty, to
equalize the loss or place it where it belongs. Larger enterprises
call for greater alliances of adventurers and specialization in
the calculation of the hazards; security is obtained through asso-
ciation; the premium payer is now the ultimate surety. As the
knowledge acquired through these operations becomes more
scientific and their management increasingly efficient, group in-
demnity on a more extended scale may be anticipated. The
same tendency is reflected in other branches of the law. Such
a result must lead to a revision of much that now seems of im-
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portance in the law of suretyship and guaranty, but, happily
there will be no dearth of new problems. "The force which is
evolving throughout the organized world is a limited force,
which is always seeking to transcend itself and always remains
inadequate to the work it would fain produce."
William H. Loyd.
Uniiversity of Pennsylvania Law School.
